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                 Appellant






On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
07-cv-03329
District Judge:  Honorable Anita B. Brody
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
Before:  BARRY, AMBRO and SMITH, Circuit Judges





On August 13, 2007, Standford Leroy Large, a prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a
2
lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 against a variety of defendants alleging that his
civil rights had been violated during his  arrest on April 19, 2002, when the arresting
officers beat him and questioned him without reading him his Miranda rights.  The
District Court dismissed Large’s complaint, reasoning that his claim of excessive force
was time-barred and his Miranda claim failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).  Large filed a timely notice
of appeal and later filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), which was
subsequently granted by this Court.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1291.   We may summarily affirm the
District Court’s judgment if the appeal presents no substantial question, 3d Cir. LAR 27.4
and I.O.P. 10.6,  and may affirm on different grounds, provided the basis for an affirmance
was before the District Court .  See Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902,
904 (3d Cir. 1997).
The District Court dismissed Large’s excessive force claim pursuant to the statute
of limitations.  As the court explained, because the actions forming the basis of Large’s
complaint occurred in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania’s two year
statutory period applies to his claims.  See Disabled In Action of Pennsylvania v.
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 539 F.3d 199, 208 (3d Cir. 2008). 
The limitations period begins when the plaintiff knows or had reason to know of
the injury forming the basis for the federal civil rights action.   Genty v. Resolution Trust
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Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 919 (3d Cir. 1991).  Applying Genty to Appellant’s excessive force
claim, it is apparent that Large was aware of his alleged mistreatment as it occurred on the
date of his arrest, April 19, 2002.  Accordingly, the District Court properly dismissed
Large’s excessive force claim as it was filed in 2007, several years beyond the 2 year
statute of limitations.  
The District Court did not apply a statute of limitations analysis to Large’s Miranda
claim, opting instead to dismiss the claim pursuant to Heck.  As the District Court
explained, § 1983 is not an avenue for relief from the mere failure to provide a Miranda
warning.  Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772 (1994) and Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d
1241, 1256 (3d Cir. 1994).  Relief may, however, be available pursuant to § 1983 if the
statement obtained without a Miranda warning is used at trial.  Renda v. King, 347 F.3d
550, 557-59 (3d Cir. 2003).  See also McKinley v. City of Mansfield, 404 F.3d 418, 436-
39 (6th Cir. 2005) and Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, Illinois, 434 F.3d 1006, 1025-27
(7th Cir. 2006).
The District Court rejected the claim as barred by Heck, where the Supreme Court
held that “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a
conviction or sentence invalid, a 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
       The Eighth Circuit has analyzed this exact question and concluded that Miranda-1
based § 1983 claims do not run afoul of Heck.  Simmons v. O’Brien, 77 F.3d 1093, 1094-
95 (8th Cir. 1996). Similarly, seeking damages for the use of evidence obtained from an
illegal wiretap at one’s criminal trial is not prohibited by Heck. Apampa v. Layng, 157
F.3d 1103, 1105 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. §
2254.”  512 U.S. 477 at 486-87.  Explaining further the Court continued, “when a state
prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction
or sentence.” Id. at 487.  Emphasizing the importance of the word “necessarily,” the
Court explained, “if the district court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if
successful will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment
against the plaintiff, the actions should be allowed to proceed.” Id.  In footnote 7, the
Heck Court provided an example of such a case: 
a suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable search may lie even if
the challenged search produced evidence that was introduced in a state criminal
trial resulting in the § 1983 plaintiff’s still-outstanding conviction.  Because of
doctrines like independent source and inevitable discovery, . . . and especially
harmless error,  . . . such a § 1983 action, even if successful would not necessarily
imply that the plaintiff’s conviction was unlawful.
 Id. (internal citations omitted).  See also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 646-47
(2004).
Applying Heck and Nelson here, we are unconvinced that a finding in Large’s
favor on the Miranda claim would necessarily imply that his conviction was unlawful.1
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We do not have any record of whether the evidence allegedly obtained in violation of
Miranda was even used at the criminal proceedings. Without a review of the state trial
court’s transcript it is impossible to determine if Large’s conviction resulted exclusively
from his own statements or if other independent evidence sufficient to result in his
conviction was considered as well.  According to Defendant Kuklentz’ affidavit of
probable cause which was attached as Exhibit C to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint, “a statement given by Fernbach indicated that she and Large were
in the practice of trafficking cocaine together.” This statement alone suggests that even
without Large’s incriminating statements, the trial court may have had sufficient evidence
to convict Large.  We need not resolve this issue here, however, because it is clear that
the statute of limitations has also run on Appellant’s Miranda claim. 
A complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim on statute of
limitations grounds if it is apparent on the face of the Complaint that the action was
untimely filed and the affirmative defense was also clearly plead by defendants. See
Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1385 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994). 
In the damages section of his complaint, Large states that the alleged injury “has
now cost the plaintiff in excess of (3), Three-Years of his life.” (Complaint Exhibit B).  
Although Large did not explicitly state which of the two alleged injuries he believes cost
him the three years of his life, taken in proper context it is clear that he was referring to
the freedom he lost as a result of his conviction in 2004 and subsequent incarceration–not
       Pinpointing the beginning of the statute of limitations period that applies to Large’s2
Miranda claim requires determining when the violation occurred.   This Court has held
that “a claim accrues in a federal cause of action as soon as a potential claimant either is
aware, or should be aware, of the existence of a source of injury.”  Oshiver at 1386. See
also Gibson v. Superintendant of New Jersey Dept. Of Law and Public Safety, 411 F.3d
427, 436 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding false arrest and false imprisonment claims are not
necessarily barred by Heck, but the causes of action accrue on the date of the arrest.)  See
Simmons at 1094-95 (8th Cir. 1996) (Miranda claim not barred by Heck, but the claim
accrued at the time of the Miranda violation). Large’s Miranda rights were not violated
until the illegally obtained statement was introduced at his criminal trial. Supra. Once this
occurred at trial in his presence, Large knew or should have known of the injury. Thus,
applying Oshiver, his cause of action accrued at that time.
While the exact date the alleged illegally obtained statement was used in trial
cannot be determined from the record, the criminal docket sheet reveals that the guilty
verdict was rendered by the Montgomery County trial Judge on March 26, 2004. The
alleged Miranda violation must have occurred on or before that date. Crediting Large with
the latest possible date of the Miranda violation still results in the statute of limitations
running on March 27, 2006, a full 16 months before Large filed his claim.
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a literal shortening of his life as a result of the excessive force he alleges occurred at the
time of his arrest.   With an injury that he admits was at least 3 years old at the time he
filed his complaint, as evidenced by the text of the Complaint, Large’s Miranda claim is
outside the two year statute of limitations.   Defendants argued that the Complaint was2
time-barred in their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, thereby satisfying the
second prerequisite for dismissal outlined by Oshiver.
 Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily
affirm the Judgment of the District Court. 
